arbitrary correlation structure among collateral assets, we extend related models of the multiple-asset security that specify either perfect positive correlation or complete independence among collateral assets in the pool (e.g., Boot and Thakor (1993) ).
To illustrate security valuation, we consider a stylized collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO) security structure in which return of principal due to scheduled loan amortization or early loan termination is distributed top-down to securityholders. That is, the most senior tranche has strict priority on all principal pay? ment cash flows until completely paid down. Once the face value of the senior tranche is zero, all principal flows to the next highest ranking tranche until it too is paid down, and so on. A further distinction between residential and commercial mortgage-backed CMOs is that?due to the inability to insure against default on commercial mortgages?the face amount of the lowest priority tranche is reduced by the shortfall between loan balance and recovery when default occurs. Default risk is, therefore, shifted down through the structure to the lower priority securities. If default rates are high enough, there may be insufficient principal balance in the first-loss securities to cover all losses, and shortfalls will have to be allocated to successively higher tranches.
Methodologically, neither a purely forward nor purely backward approach is entirely satisfactory when attempting to price the CMBS. The advantages of a forward (Monte Carlo) approach are its ability to handle multiple state variables and its ability to distribute cash flows to various payment classes, the priority of which depends on historical allocations. A forward-looking approach is unsatisfactory, however, in its determination of optimal borrower default decision-making, which requires the calculation ofthe value of waiting to default. Alternatively, contingentclaims models of whole commercial loan valuation like that of Titman and Torous (1989) determine borrower default behavior endogenously and produce default risk premiums that match observed premium levels quite nicely. However, valuation problems with more than three state variables are intractable using their method, since numerical computation time increases exponentially with the number of state variables. Moreover, a purely backward approach is not well suited to allocating path-dependent cash flows to various CMBS tranches.2 Instead, we employ a combined backward/forward approach to CMBS valua? tion that simultaneously reflects endogenous default decision-making by individual borrowers and accurately allocates cash flows to various tranches, while avoiding the dimensionality problems associated with numerous state variables. In the first stage of a two-stage modeling process, we determine the optimal default bound? aries for individual borrowers whose mortgages are part ofthe CMBS pool. When current property value exceeds the boundary value, the borrower continues repaying the loan according to contract terms. Alternatively, hitting the boundary results in default with the property value flowing into the pool as return of principal.3 The second stage in CMBS valuation is to use a Monte Carlo approach to simulate state variable paths. Utilizing the previously computed default boundary, realized paths determine cash flows that are allocated to the various tranches. Realized tranche values are then calculated over a large number of Monte Carlo trials to determine respective tranche prices. Finally, given the tranche price, a yield-to-maturity is calculated and compared to the yield on a benchmark riskless bond to produce a promised yield spread. We find that CMBS pricing is especially sensitive to several structural and parameter value inputs. As expected, security design in terms of relative percentage tranche size is important. For parameter values used in this study, senior tranches whose share is 70 percent or less of the total pool are found to be immune from default loss, but not from the effect of early return of principal due to default.
Indeed, the senior security is exposed to cash flow timing risk, which results in small but persistently positive yield spreads. Given our CMO payment structure, 2Assuming away the dimensionality issue for the moment, one could conceivably handle the allocation problem by first working backward through the pricing grid to determine boundary values, and then moving forward in the same grid to allocate and value cash flows. See Kau et al. (1993) for an application of this type with respect to pricing adjustable rate mortgages, whose cash flows depend on past interest rate state variable realizations. 3Our approach has some similarities with that of McConnell and Singh (1994), which determines a critical interest rate at which mortgage prepayment optimally occurs for each refinancing cost class at every point in time throughout the life of the mortgage. In contrast, we must determine a critical property price at which default occurs at each point in time throughout the life of the mortgages and for each feasible spot rate of interest that may occur at a given time t. Thus, McConnell and Singh determines critical interest rates over the mortgage term, whereas we determine a three-dimensional surface of critical property prices as a function of interest rates and time. mezzanine level security classes are better protected against this cash flow timing risk in addition to being well protected against default loss risk. This generates the surprising result that, insome scenarios, the senior securityholders may actually require higher yield spreads than certain lower priority security classes.
Lower priority tranches are found to be quite sensitive to variation in property value and, therefore, to default risk. The correlation structure among collateral assets in the pool, in particular, is found to be an important determinant of tranche value. We find that better pool diversification (i.e., lower overall pooled cash flow volatility) may actually lower tranche value to low priority classes that are expected to be out-of-the-money with respect to full return of principal. This occurs because the payoff function to low-rated security classes is convex over the relevant range of likely asset value outcomes, thus suggesting that higher cash flow volatility may actually increase security value. We also address the question of how large the securitized pool must be to realize most of the effects of asset value diversification. In a pool in which loans have similar contractual features and size characteristics, and where the underlying collateral asset values are at least weakly positively correlated, we find that only five to 10 mortgages are needed for the mezzanine and low-rated securities to largely realize diversification effects. Consider mortgage i,i= 1,...,N, whose value, Ml, is contingent on collateral property price, Pi9 the risk-free spot interest rate, r, and current time t, where time left until loan maturity is r = T ? t. Standard arguments that incorporate the state 4McConnell and Singh (1994) has examined the sensitivity of residential MBS price to alternative single factor interest rate model specifications and found that pricing differences are small, as long as the current term structure is adequately duplicated. In our application, in which the mortgage termination decision is even less sensitive to changes in interest rates (as compared to prepayment decisions with residential loans), particular model specification matters even less. Hence, we choose a process that is likely to be familiar to most readers. 5Cross-collateralization is sometimes known to occur in CMBS. This type of contract could be handled using our pricing methodology by recognizing that multiple mortgages, once cross-collateralized, can be treated as one "bundled" mortgage with its own unique set of risk characteristics. See Childs et al. (1996) for further background.
6The rate of mortgage payment also depends on state variable parameters and default boundary conditions as they impact mortgage value, factors that we discuss shortly. Thus, for any feasible pair (r, t), there exists an iV-dimensional vector of critical property values, P*(r, t) = [P*(r, t)]. This vector of critical property prices, which is found using the traditional backward pricing equation approach, can now be used to determine the return of individual mortgage principal and interest as it flows into the total mortgage pool. 7 "Standard arguments" include assumptions requiring that the assets are continuously tradable at no cost, and that they can be sold short. These assumptions obviously do not perfectly describe commercial real estate asset and debt markets. However, if markets are dynamically complete, an alternative (and perhaps more realistic) set of assumptions could be used to determine a (slightly modified) pricing equation. See, for example, Grenadier ((1995), p. 304) for a discussion of similar issues in the context of asset leasing markets.
8 See Titman and Torous (1989) for a complete set of boundary conditions needed to fully specify the pricing problem. Like Titman and Torous, we ignore the costs of borrower and lender default in the pricing of commercial real estate debt. Although these respective costs may be significant, their effects are offsetting so that the net impact on debt value may be trivial. In lieu of any empirical evidence to the contrary, we choose to keep the analysis as simple as possible. Including these costs, if desired, would be straightforward. 
t)+FM(t)+Fj(t) < FPL(t).
This relationship will continue to hold for all t > 0 due to allocations of principal and default losses.14 Let cs, cM, and cj be the coupon rates for the principal-based tranches. These coupon rates must satisfy max{cs, cm, cj} < min{ei,..., cx} to guarantee that sufficient pooled interest cash flow is available for distribution as interest to the principal-based tranches.
12Of course, other structures are possible. For example, a finer tranche structure is certainly feasible and is quite often employed. If the pool is over-collateralized, a residual principal tranche will also be included.
13We have considered the possibility that there could be excess principal once the pool is retired. This would occur if mortgage values are such that default occurs when property values in sum exceed the mortgage balances. We have performed simulations that verify that state realizations of this type do not occur given the interest rate process assumed in equation (2). 14This inequality is strict when the pool is "overcollateralized," in the sense that issued principal claims are less than the aggregate pool balance. We do not consider a residual principal tranche, so the face value relationship above holds with equality in our subsequent analysis. 
The rate of cash flow to the residual interest-only tranche also must be accounted for. This rate of cash flow is (11b) TFIO = IFPL -csFs(t) -cMFM(t) -cjFj(t).
The 10 cash flow rate will generally decline over time as the total pool balance declines through scheduled amortization and return of principal through defaults.
Next consider the discrete cash payments. Discrete principal payments are allocated to the most senior tranche first. Any discrete principal payment amounts in excess ofthe remaining face value ofthe more senior tranche goes toward paying down the next most senior tranche. Formally, this prioritization is expressed as
DPIO(r) = 0.
As previously discussed, losses associated with loan default must be allocated to the most junior tranche first. If the default loss allocation exceeds the remaining face value, the tranche is simply eliminated and any remaining loss is shifted to the next higher ranking tranche. The formal prioritization of losses occurs as follows,
Lj(t) = min{F7(r),LPL(r)}, (13b) LM(t) = mm{FM(t),LPL(t)-Lj(t)}, (13c) Ls(t) = LPL(r) -Lj(t) -LM(t).
Finally, the face values of the respective tranches can be adjusted once the above allocations are known. The face value ofa tranche at time t is the original face value less the cumulative continuously paid principal to date, less the cumulative discrete payments and losses to date. Formally, nrmin js generally positive rather than zero since, given the mean-reverting process of Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985b), the Hull and White (1990) method that we implement during the first stage has only nondownward branching when r becomes small enough. The quantity r"1** is also finite, for analogous reasons.
18 As part of the first stage, interpolation is done across property prices to establish the boundary of the continuation region for each interest rate in the grid. A similar interpolation is performed for interest rates that do not fall exactly on the interest rate node value.
19To ensure the accuracy ofthe numerical solutions at 10,000 trials, simulations with up to 50,000 were performed?which yielded no qualitative differences in the results. Solutions to the CMBS tranche values are obtained using a discretized version ofthe two-step procedure described previously. In doing so, we consider 48 time steps per year. Because all of the individual mortgages are priced at par, initial pool value equals the face value of the mortgages comprising the pool. We have verified that the value of the individual tranches add up to the total pool value. Indeed, in all parameter value cases considered in this paper, the sum of all tranche values obtained through Monte Carlo analysis are within 0.10 percent ofthe total pool value determined in the first stage ofthe numerical analysis.
20Note that the benchmark riskless yield is computed based on the expected effects of default on the timing ofthe cash flows. This expected cash flow approach provides a superior measure of yield spread as compared to simply calculating a benchmark yield based on anticipation of promised cash flows. For example, in an upward sloping term structure environment, use ofa benchmark based on promised as opposed to expected cash flows will generally downwardly bias the measure of yield spread. 
III. Pricing Results

A. Mortgage Contract
21
Typical pool sizes range from one to several hundred mortgages. We choose N = 6 to balance two opposing considerations. On one hand, because fundamental valuation behavior can be reflected with only a small number of pooled mortgages (e.g., pool diversification effects are largely realized with five to 10 mortgages), we can keep AT relatively small. On the other hand, we want to consider a pool that is larger than N = 3 to demonstrate the model's ability to efficiently handle many state variables. 22Loan-to-value ratios in the 75-percent range with seven-year terms-to-maturity are commonplace in the commercial mortgage marketplace, as are partially amortizing loans. This contract structure is also consistent with studies of whole loan commercial mortgage pricing (e.g., Titman and Torous 
B. Numerical Results
We first discuss senior tranche yield spreads. Table 1 shows yield spreads are small, ranging from eight to 20 basis points. At a 70-percent pool share, this payment class is, for all practical purposes, immune from default loss risk, which results in a relative lack of yield spread variability over property volatility and property correlation structure. The positive spreads are due to the stochastic nature of interest rates. As seen from the default boundary condition specified in equation (5), higher probabilities of borrower default correspond to low interest rate realizations. Given the greater propensity of borrower default for low interest rate outcomes, the senior securityholder experiences a return of principal that resembles interest rate call risk. This effect is factored into the security's yield. Therefore, although the senior tranche may be immune from default loss, it is not immune to the effects ofthe early return of principal that follow from loan default.
This call risk effect is also responsible for the slight decrease in yield spread Interestingly, when the junior security has a 20-percent pool share and when the pool is well diversified in the sense that p^ = 0, / ^ j, yield spreads are actually lower than spreads associated with the senior security. This is due to two related structural effects. First, in this case, the mezzanine security is fully protected against default losses. Second, due to the senior tranche having priority on return of principal, the mezzanine security is also insulated from cash flow tim?
ing uncertainty that follows from default-induced return of principal. The result is a security that is (essentially) fully protected against both default loss risk and default-related call risk.
Other parameter value effects on mezzanine tranche pricing are as follows.
Primarily due to the impact of default loss risk, required yield spreads are higher when property volatility increases from cr; = 0.15 to 07 = 0.20. A similar outcome results when pr>p. increases from 0 to 0.2. There are also significant differences depending on the shape of the yield curve. To see this, recall that both term structures have the same long-term rate parameter of v -0.09. The initial spot rate is much lower in the steeper term structure environment; hence, expected discount rates over the life of the seven-year loan are higher in the flatter term structure.
Higher expected discount rates decrease the required default risk premium, ceterus paribus, since the present value impact of default loss is lower when discount rates are higher. Table 3 . This tranche is quite sensitive to security structure, where decreasing the pool share results in a higher likelihood that it will be out-of-the-money in terms of receiving substantial repayment of principal. Also note that the magnitude of these spreads is typically rather high, with required yields-to-maturity that can easily exceed returns expected to the underlying collateral asset. Perhaps the most notable aspect of our results concerns the effect of property value correlation on junior tranche yield. As the pool becomes better diversified, required yields generally increase substantially.24
Now consider the junior (or first-loss) tranche results shown in
The intuition for this result 24This volatility effect with subordinated debt was first recognized by Black and Cox (1976) . The difference between our finding and theirs is that correlation structure between multiple assets is re-follows from a recognition that the return-of-principal payoff function for the junior tranche has characteristics similar to an out-of-the-money call option. Expected losses do not change as a function of correlation structure, but the variance of these losses does change. The cost of increased pool cash flow volatility is slight, due to payoff function convexity and the fact that the junior piece is expected to be out-of-the-money with respect to full return of principal. However, the benefit to higher pool cash flow volatility is that there is an increased probability of low losses?which results in a higher expected payoff and, therefore, decreases the required yield to this security. Not surprisingly, the correlation structure effect is strongest when the first-loss piece has the low 5-percent share. To see the out-of-the-money option analogy more precisely, in Figure 1 , we show the loss density function on a $100, Af = 20, CMBS pool for alternative property value correlation structures. Due to the central limit theorem, the zero correlation case turns out to be approximately normally distributed with a loss density mode of about $8. As correlations between collateralizing assets increase, the loss density function shows greater variance?and eventually becomes bimodal as asset correlations approach one. Indeed, given a pool composed of perfectly correlated collateral assets (or equivalently, a single-asset CMBS), default risk is literally all or nothing?where the probability of zero losses is quite high. As a result, first-loss tranche value is higher?and, therefore, required spreads are lower?when cash flow volatility as determined by property value correlation structure is higher.
Lastly, yields-to-maturity for the 10 residual tranche are shown in Table 4 .
Except for property volatility, cr,?which has a powerful effect on the expected timing of loan termination?yield spreads are relatively insensitive to alterna? tive mortgage/CMBS pool design or economic environment. For example, given tranche coupon rates used in this study, allocation of cash flow within the vari? ous principal-based tranches has little effect on 10 price. Similarly, yield spread is fairly insensitive to differences in property value correlation, although the property value correlation/call risk effect described with senior security pricing is responsible for having a slight impact on pricing.
Summing up, these results suggest that the correlation structure of proper? ties underlying the pooled mortgages plays a significant and rather unique role in CMBS pricing, especially when compared to more well-known asset-backed 
